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PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN EU AND AUSTRALIAN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW POLICY PROCESSES
JAMES DAY*
I

INTRODUCTION

The debate surrounding the reach of bilateral investment and free trade
agreements is fierce and well covered. Investor-state dispute settlement
(‘ISDS’) mechanisms, for instance, are characterised as anything from
indefensible affronts on states’ ability to regulate to vitally important tools for
encouraging foreign direct investment and facilitating economic growth.
As international investment law policy (such as in regard to ISDS) becomes
more divisive, the perception grows that it is an area administered almost
exclusively by the executive arm of government; away from the legislature
and out of the public eye. This is despite these policies crystallising into
agreements that are felt heavily in the domestic spheres, where laws are open
to challenge, treasuries open to appropriation and markets open to
international competition.
This perception is live in the EU and Australia, the subjects of this paper. The
EU institutions face a public confidence that is at an all-time low, with a large
part of this sentiment emanating from its investment law policy, whereas
Australia has recently concluded a raft of free trade agreements (‘FTAs’)
which are earning the ire of a people that are increasingly discontent with each
one that is inked.
The EU and Australia have been chosen for this comparison due to their
unique and innovative positions on international investment law. The EU has
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recently just proposed a major restructuring of the ISDS system to be adopted
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’) and has just
amended the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada to
be in line with this proposal. Australia, meanwhile, stood almost alone six
years ago in adopting a blanket refusal of ISDS provisions in their investment
agreements and the recently-signed Transpacific Trade Partnership (‘TPP’)
agreement includes an investment chapter containing a slew of innovative
measures to protect the members’ right to regulate.1
These decisions by Australia and the EU to take different stances on
investment law are the outcome of democratic processes which are structured
by legal frameworks. Lying at the heart of these legal frameworks is the
democratic principle of participation of those people being represented. In the
case of the EU, these are enshrined by article 11 of its ‘constitution’ (the
Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’))2 which comprises three sub-principles:
openness,

inclusiveness

and

responsiveness. In

contrast,

Australia’s

constitution only briefly sets out its legal framework as a representative
democracy, which necessarily inherits elements of participation in its
administration of government.
So, in a field of law which is proving increasingly divisive and viewed as unparticipatory, the question is asked: which international investment law policy
process lends more to principles of participation than the other?
This question will be explored over the following comparative paper. That is:

1

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the Government of Australia and the
Governments of: Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the United States of America and Vietnam, signed 4 February 2016 (yet to be
ratified). Full text released by the Australian government at <www.dfat.gov.au>; for example
see the specific industry carve-outs (art 9.9.3), the ability to trigger state-to-state consultations
(art 9.11.3), the ability to make binding joint interpretations (art 9.22.3) and an explicit
recognition that states can regulate to protect public welfare, health and environment (art
9.15).
2
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, open for signature 7 February 1992
[2012] C 326/13 (entered into force 1 November 2013) Art 11.
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1. how the international investment law policies are made, through which
legal

structures, involving what stakeholders and through what

forums; and
2. how these processes compare to one another by reference to the
participatory principles of openness, inclusiveness and responsiveness.
Chapter I develops the idea of participatory democracy in the EU and
Australia as the benchmark against which the two processes are measured.
Chapter II examines the international investment law policy process of the EU
and Chapter III does likewise for Australia. Particular focus will be put on the
processes surrounding the TTIP and the TTP; two megaregional FTAs
involving the EU and Australia that are currently in the process of being
concluded. Chapter IV will assess these two subjects’ international investment
law policy processes as against the principles of democratic participation and
then compare the two processes against each other as to which is more
participatory.
II

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AS A BENCHMARK FOR COMPARISON

Both the EU and Australia are representative democracies: systems of rule that
embrace elected officials who have undertaken to ‘represent’ the interests and
views of the citizens under the framework of the ‘rule of law’.3 One of the
pillars of representative democracies is the principle of participation of those
people being represented; this principle underpins the strand of democratic
theory known as ‘participatory democracy’.
Participatory democracy is one of a number of strands of democratic theory
which are conceived as being variants of, or complements to, representative
democracies. Representative systems require these complements because,
although they provide the citizens with the power to freely choose their
representatives, the involvement of the citizens is otherwise ‘sadly but
3

D Held Models of Democracy (Polity Press, vol 3, 2006) (‘Held’) 4.
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inescapably limited in a large-scale, complex, densely populated society’.4 It
is this realism, together with scepticism of a system which forms policy and
law on the basis of the preferences of the majority (and leaves the rights of the
few exposed), which requires other forms of democracies to come in and
provide checks and balances to the representative system.5
Participatory democratic theory is a relatively new strand (though can at its
core be found in the formulation of democratic theory in Ancient Greece6) that
is broadly based on the premises that:
a) the freedoms and liberties espoused by liberal democratic theories must
be contextualised by what liberties are actually tangible and can be
achieved for everyday life;
b) the state is ‘inescapably locked into the maintenance and reproduction
of the inequalities of everyday life’ and it is therefore neither separate
nor impartial;
c) as a result, elections are insufficient to ensure accountability of the
governing bodies; so
d) the true way of ensuring accountability and maintaining liberty is with
‘direct and continuous involvement of citizens in the regulation of
society and state’.7
Indeed, according to this theory, upon a higher degree of participation, people
will be more likely to believe that state decisions are binding,8 develop a less

4

Ibid 85.
J Uhr Deliberative Democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (Cambridge
University Press, 1998) (‘Uhr’) 10.
6
For example, see the famous speech at Pericles’ Funeral in about 431BC: ‘We do not say
that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business, we say that
he has no business here at all’, referred to in Held above n 3, 14.
7
Paraphrased from the theories of Macpherson and Pateman in Held above n 7, 209-214.
8
Held above n 3, 212.
5

23

(2016) 18 UNDALR

estranged view of the government and a more concerned view of the
collective.9
Participatory democratic processes are fundamental institutions in the EU and
Australian systems of government for complementing the broader form of
representative government. This is especially so in international investment
law, an area that is increasingly being cited as undemocratic.
Participatory Democracy in the European Union
The EU is perhaps at the forefront of participatory democracy, enshrining
participation as a legal norm in article 11 of the TEU.
The insertion of this provision in 2007 was a result of a gradual political and
judicial development in the late 20th century, beginning with the perception
that something more than just political representation was required to grant the
governing body ‘legitimacy’ in its decision making.10 This concept of
legitimacy, initially developed by Habermas in 1976, is a core one when
discussing the EU’s political and legal evolution.11 With the incredible growth
of international organisations following the Cold War, the previously held
view that their legitimacy came from state consent was on shaky ground. Their
actions were instead seen as requiring democratic justification which was
insufficient.12
It was said that one way this insufficiency could be addressed was through
direct civic participation, which compensates for the lack of direct national
9

Ibid; C Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970).
A von Bogdandy ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of
Articles 9 to 12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ (2012) 23.2 European Journal of
International Law 315, 325-6.
11
Habermas says that where a government is in a continuous state of change and breakdown
in policy (a rationality crisis) and becomes more interventionist to its people to avoid a
national crisis, it becomes unable to meet the demands of its people and it crosses the line
away from democracy and into a more oppressive model of governing; finding itself in a
legitimacy crisis. See J Habermas Legitimation Crisis (Heinemann, 1976) discussed in Held
above n 3, 192-196.
12
von Bogdandy above n 10, 320.
10
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parliamentary control.13 As expressed in the ‘governance turn in EU-studies’,14
if an organisation conducts itself in a transparent and responsive manner, it
may be granted more democratic legitimacy in decision-making.15
Consequently, articles 9 to 11 of the TEU, the core of this approach to
European democratic legitimacy, were born. Article 9 lays down the principle
of equality,16 article 10 explicitly characterises the EU as a representative
democracy17 and article 11 is the enshrinement of European participatory
democracy.18
The inclusion of article 11 was the first acknowledgment of ‘constitutional
relevance’ of participatory and consultative practices at the institutional level
and, with the prescriptive use of ‘shall’, signalled the end of the discretionary
manner by which the previous practices were undertaken.19 Further, in
13

Ibid.
Christian Marxsen ‘Participatory Democracy in Europe: Article 11 TEU and the Legitimacy
of the European Union’ in F Fabbrini, E H Ballin, & H Somsen (Eds.) What Form of
Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing, 2015) 151
(‘Marxsen’) 152.
15
Acar Kutay ‘Limits of Participatory Democracy in European Governance’ (2015) 21.6
European Law Journal 803 (‘Kutay’) 806.
16
Art. 9: ‘In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its
citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.’
17
Art. 10(1): ‘The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.’
18
Article 11:
1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas
of Union action.
2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with
representative associations and civil society.
3. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in
order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent.
4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member
States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework
of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a
legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.
The procedures and conditions required for such a citizens' initiative shall be determined in
accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
19
A Alemanno ‘Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law Transparency, Participation
and Democracy’ (2014) European Law Review 9.
14
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creating a mechanism by which citizens can propose action, article 11(4) gave
‘teeth’ to the right to participate and established the first ‘transnational, direct
democratic tool’ in history.20
The policy documents of the EU institutions, together with its commentary,
illuminate democratic participation under article 11 as being comprised of
three sub-principles:
a) openness, which requires the participatory initiatives to be conducted
in a transparent manner, which allows the public to access information
on the input, process, outcome and also the motives of the institution;21
b) inclusiveness, which requires the participatory initiatives to be
available to general participation and public scrutiny, including as wide
a cross-section of interests as possible,22 and avoiding the overinfluence of strong, organised groups;23 and
c) responsiveness, which requires the EU to provide feedback on the
result of the public input and how it will be used.24
It is these three principles which have formed the basis of assessing and
comparing just how participatory the international investment law policy
processes of the EU and Australia are.
Participatory Democracy in Australia

20

Ibid 12.
See European Commission, European Governance - A White Paper, 25 July 2001
(Communication) COM (2001) 428 (‘2001 White Paper’) 10; European Commission, Plan-D
for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate 13 October 2005, COM (2005) 494 (‘Plan-D’) 9;
discussed in Marxsen above n 14, 154; von Bogdandy above n 10, 329.
22
See 2001 White Paper above n 21, 17; European Commission, Towards a Reinforced
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue – General Principles and Minimum Standards for
Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 11 December 2002, COM (2002) 704
(‘Minimum Standards’) 17; discussed in Marxsen above n 14, 154.
23
von Bogdandy above n 10, 329.
24
See Plan-D above n 21, 19; Minimum Standards above n 22, 21; both discussed in Marxsen
above n 14, 154.
21
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Unlike the EU, Australia’s adherence to participatory principles is largely
uncodified, Articles 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution provide that the
Australian system of government is a representative democracy, with two
fundamental tenets: popular control of government and political equality.25
As part of these two tenets lie a number of other values, that are not found in
the Constitution, including the principle of participation of the people.26 As
Professor Crawford states, one of the core values of democracy is ‘the right of
all citizens to participate in the political life of their societies’.27
In 2011, when the Australian Parliamentary Library published a research paper
on citizens’ engagement in policy making,28 it championed participation not
only on the ethical basis of being ‘the right thing to do’, but also as a useful
tool for decision and policy-makers alike. Engaging with citizens provides
governments with an opportunity to access expert knowledge and also educate
people about the policies themselves.29
Habermasian theories also made their way to Australian shores, however, and
the principle reason for citizen participation therefore remains that of
legitimising the policy decisions taken by the governing bodies (as in the
EU).30 As one Australian commentator put it,

public participation as an addition to representative processes may provide
an antidote to national political elites or technocrats and also offer an
25

M Sawyer, N Abjorensen and P Larkin Australia: the State of Democracy (Federation Press,
2009) (‘Sawyer’) 2.
26
Ibid.
27
James Crawford, International Law as an Open System: Selected Essays (Cameron May,
2002) 39; discussed in Bryan Mercurio and Rebecca Laforgia, ‘Expanding Democracy: Why
Australia Should Negotiate for Open and Transparent Dispute Settlement in Its Free Trade
Agreements’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 485 (‘Mecurio and Laforgia’)
509.
28
Brenton Holmes ‘Citizens’ Engagement in Policymaking and the Design of Public Services’
(2011) 1 Parliament of Australia - Parliamentary Library (‘Holmes’).
29
Ibid 4.
30
Ibid.
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effective way to overcome a citizen’s sense of futility and powerlessness
in the face of these larger forces.31
1

Participatory Democracy in International Affairs

The need for participation is enhanced in regard to treaty-making in Australia,
which is enacted exclusively by the executive arm of government.32 As the
traditional litmus test of elections is not a feature of treaty-making in
Australia, there is greater value placed on ‘open continuous participatory
decision-making processes’.33
An examination of Australia’s treaty-making came to a head in the mid-1990s
with the landmark Trick or Treaty?34 report of the Senate Legal and
Constitutional References Committee, which precipitated a number of reforms
designed to strengthen the treaty-making process and give Parliament a greater
role.35 Since these reforms, however, concerns have resurfaced and are often
levelled towards the government for committing to international obligations
outside the public eye and without any parliamentary involvement. In a text
written by four leading Australian public international lawyers, for example, it
was submitted that despite a number of reforms to address these since the
1990s, ‘the modest role now played by parliament has done little in reality to
reduce the democratic deficit that prompted the fears in the first place’.36
The change of government in 2007 facilitated a number of further changes. In
2009, the government commissioned a review of the administration of
government, which concluded the following:
31

Ibid 15.
Australian Constitution s 61.
33
See Mercurio and Laforgia above n 27, 509, quoting Professor Steve Charnovitz.
34
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Trick or
Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties (November 1995).
35
Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee, Parliament of Australia, Blind
Agreement: Reforming Australia’s Treaty-Making Process (June 2015) (‘Trade Committee
Report’) 71.
36
H Charlesworth, M Chiam, D Hovell, and G Williams, No Country is an Island: Australia
and International Law (UNSW Press, 2006) 153.
32
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We consider a final essential ingredient for high performance as a public service is the
paramount principle of focusing on citizens in the formulation of policy advice. This can
mean making sure that citizens’ or clients’ experiences of engaging with the program,
service or regulation resulting from the policy intervention is at the forefront of the policy
maker’s mind. This will involve, where possible, actively engaging citizens and
stakeholders in the policy formulation process so that their perspectives and ideas are taken
into account.37

Yet, if there are plenty of governmental statements committing to public
participation and engagement, the extent to which the rhetoric matches reality
is more obscure.38 This paper examines this question.
The sub-principles of participatory democracy based on article 11 of the TEU,
of openness, inclusiveness and responsiveness, are used as the benchmark to
assess and compare the features of both the EU’s and Australia’s international
investment law policy processes. They are used to assess Australia’s process
as well, as it provides an instructive method of comparison where it does not
itself have a codified participatory democratic norm, as the EU does in article
11.
III

EUROPEAN UNION

EU investment law policy is facing challenges. In light of the ‘earthquake’
election of late 2014, which now sees anti-establishment parties holding over
200 of the 751 seats in the Parliament,39 there are real changes being
necessitated in the decision-making process. Indeed, since the elections, EU
Council President van Rompuy has issued a memorandum to other Heads of
Government, believing that they should limit policy ambitions on the TTIP
and ‘not take on policy that can be better handled by individual states’ due to
the difficulty it will face in ratifying it.40 As one commentator stated, the

37

Terry Moran, Building the World’s Best Public Service (2009) 20.
Holmes above n 27, 18.
39
P Hugg and S Wilkinson ‘The 2014 European Parliament Elections and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership: Economics and Politics Collide’ (2015) 24 Journal of
Transnational Law & Policy 117, 119-124.
40
Ibid 146.
38
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TTIP ‘remains a fragile creature, at the mercy of politicians and public
opinion’.41
In light of this anti-EU sentiment in the international investment law space, it
is perhaps even more important to facilitate participation in the policy process.
This chapter analyses the processes for how international investment law
policies are made and outlines the participatory initiatives in these processes.
Process Generally
At a starting point, as the EU is not a nation state, but rather an international
organisation (or staatenverbund42), the institutions of the EU are only able to
take action in an area that is conferred to it by the EU Treaties.43
The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the European Treaties, widened the areas that
conferred the EU exclusive competence, including over the ‘common
commercial policy’ on foreign direct investment.44 This includes the exclusive
competence to negotiate and conclude agreements with the traditional
substantive provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BITs’) and FTAs
(such as ISDS guarantees).45 These agreements bind all of the EU member
states.
The European Parliament, Council of the EU (‘Council’) and European
Commission (‘Commission’) contribute the most to the international
investment law policy process.

41

Benjamin Fox, ‘From Trade Tariffs to Trust - TTIP a Year on’ EU Observer, July 28, 2014;
Referred to in ibid 158.
42
See decision of the German Constitutional Court in Roquette Frères v. Council [1980] ECR
3333; Ferri, Delia ‘European Citizens … Mind the Gap ! Some Reflections on Participatory
Democracy in the EU’ (2013) 5.3 Perspectives on Federalism 56 (‘Ferri’) 61.
43
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992
[2009] OJ C 115/199 (entered into force 1 November 1993) (‘TFEU’) art 2(1).
44
Ibid art 207(1).
45
August Reinisch ‘The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU
BITs and Other Investment Agreements’ (2013) 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law
111 (‘Reinisch’) 116. This interpretation of ‘foreign direct investment’ is that of the European
Commission, though is subject to fierce debate.
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First, the Parliament, comprised of directly-elected members, must pass any
BIT or FTA and any legislation required to implement them.46 In addition to
having to agree to its final text, the Commission is required to keep the
Parliament fully informed at all times of negotiations47 and the Parliament
itself may also take formal votes on the progress of, and make
recommendations on, the negotiations of the agreement.
Second, the Council must give unanimous assent to any investment acts that
are proposed to it, including BITs and FTAs. The Council is comprised of
government representatives of the EU member states; the extent of the
member states’ formal involvement in the process.48 The elected officials of
the Parliament and the member state-representatives in the Council form a
‘double representation’ of the citizens, which has final say over any
agreements.49 Under article 218 of the TFEU, the Council authorises the
Commission to open negotiations, adopt directives on the negotiations,
authorise the signing of and conclusion of the agreement.
Finally, the Commission, particularly the Directorate General for Trade of the
Commission (‘DG Trade’) oversees international trade and investment policy.
DG Trade is led by the European Commissioner for Trade, currently Cecilia
Malmström, who is voted into office by the Parliament. Article 17 of the TEU
grants the Commission DG Trade (together with other Commission DGs)
considerable powers as part of the executive branch of the EU.

46

These acts follow the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’. See TFEU, above n 43 art 207(1),(2)
and 218(6)(a)(v).
47
TFEU above n43 art 207(4).
48
They do however retain the right to review proposed EU legislation with respect to
proportionality and subsidiarity and may challenge the legislation before the Court of Justice
of the EU on these grounds. See the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the
European Union, CIG 14/07, TL/P/en 2 (3 December 2007); Protocol on the Application of
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, CIG 14/07, TL/P/en (6, December 3 2007).
49
Cheneval, F. ‘The Case for Demoicracy in the EU’ in EUSA Conference Boston, March
2011, 18. This argument is strongly debated, however, with many of commentators suggesting
the external powers of the EU contributes to the crisis of democratic legitimacy in the EU.
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Participatory Initiatives
The EU has established a number of initiatives that increase the participation
of its citizens in the international investment law policy process. The main
initiatives are managed by the Commission, predominantly through
consultations, dialogues and specific transparency initiatives. There are other
initiatives managed outside the Commission, through the Parliament, the
Ombudsman and at a non-institutional level.
1

Commission-based initiatives

(a) Consultations
Perhaps the most advanced participatory initiative of the Commission is its
stakeholder consultations, performed in discharge of their obligations under
article 11(3) of the TEU. Defined as the processes taken ‘to trigger input from
outside interest parties for the shaping of policy prior to a decision’ being
made and subject to minimum standards,50 these processes are predominantly
pushed online through their platform Your Voice in Europe.51 Consultations
are published online, where citizens and stakeholder groups are invited to
complete an online questionnaire (either multiple choice or more substantive
responses). In some cases the Commission asks for written submissions to a
hearing.52 Although no citizens are excluded, in practice if not published as a
‘public consultation’, they are usually targeted towards specific stakeholder
groups.
A number of consultations have been conducted by the Commission on
specific questions of international trade and investment policy, including in

50

European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards a reinforced
culture of consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for
consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM(2002) 704, 15-16 and generally.
51
European Commission, Your Voice in Europe (2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/> .
52
Christian Marxsen ‘Open Stakeholder Consultations at the European Level- Voice of the
Citizens?’ (2015) 21.2 European Law Journal 257 (‘Marxsen’) 262.
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regard to trade relations with Japan, China the US, Thailand, Myanmar and
Morocco.53
DG Trade also held a public consultation specifically on ISDS in the TTIP
from March through July 2014 and received easily the highest level of
participants out of any consultation.54 The consultation outlined a possible EU
approach and sought feedback on the same. A text outlining the ISDS
mechanism in the EU-Canada agreement was provided to illustrate the
approach. According to the Commission’s report, four areas of concern were
raised on ISDS in the TTIP:
1. the protection of the right to regulate;
2. the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals;
3. the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS; and
4. the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism.55
Following the consultation, the Commission issued a ‘concept paper’,
addressing these concerns for the purpose of discussion with the Parliament
and the Council.56 According to this paper, the Commission used the outcome
of the TTIP consultations in developing its negotiating position (discussed
below).57
(b) Citizens Dialogue
Since March 2014, the Commission has undertaken ‘citizens’ dialogues’, an
initiative akin to a ‘town-hall meeting’ to give the public opportunities to raise
their concerns and challenge the European Commissioners on any relevant

53

European Commission, Consultations, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/> .
See European Commission, Report – Online public consultation on investment protection
and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), SWD(2015), 13 January 2015 (Report on ISDS Consultation’) 2-4
55
Ibid 4.
56
Directorate- General for Trade of the European Commission, Investment in TTIP and
beyond – the Path for Reform (2015) (‘Concept Paper on TTIP’).
57
Ibid 3.
54
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issues that are important to them. These were started in a bid to regain the
citizens’ trust that has been steadily declining since the global financial
crisis.58
This approach has been continued under the new Trade Commissioner
Malmström. On 3 December 2015, for example, Commissioner Malmström
keynoted a citizens dialogue, titled TTIP, CETA, TiSA – What does the new
trade strategy bring for Europe?, in which she clearly pointed to transparency
as being a fundamental in TTIP negotiations.59
(c) Transparency Register
The Transparency Register was set up in 2011 to allow organisation
stakeholders to get informed and ask fundamental questions of the EU, such as
what interests are being represented, who is representing these interests and on
what budget.60
(d) Civil Society Dialogues
In addition to the citizens’ dialogues, another similar initiative is its Civil
Society Dialogues. DG Trade created these in 1998 in order to exchange views
on policy and related topical issues.61 These dialogues consist of meetings

58

European Commission, Citizens’ Dialogues as a Contribution to Developing a European
Public Space: Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
(2014) 12.
59
‘So on transparency, the only liberal answer is: we need as much as possible. Access to
information about the political process is essential for democracy to work. And that's why we
have made TTIP the most open bilateral free trade negotiation in the world…Ladies and
gentlemen, what all of these efforts show, I believe, is that it is possible to have an effective
open trade policy that also safeguards democracy and is in line with European values ‘ See
speech by Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Trade at Event at Friedrich Naumann
Stiftung, Belin, ‘TTIP, CETA, TiSA – What does the new trade strategy bring for Europe?’ 3
December 2015.
60
European Commission, Transparency Register (2015)
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/staticPage/displayStaticPage.do?locale=en&r
eference=WHY_TRANSPARENCY_REGISTER> ‘Why a transparency register?’.
61
See generally DG Trade, Civil Society Dialogue, (European Union, 2011).
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between DG Trade and civil society groups registered in the Transparency
Register (above), usually together with industry experts on the given topic.
There are also specific dialogues on the EU’s free trade and investment
agreement negotiations. On 2 December 2015, for example, DG Trade held its
6th dialogue on the progress of TTIP negotiations.62
2

Non-Commission-Based Initiatives

(a) European Citizens’ Initiative
The European Citizens’ Initiative is a mechanism backed by article 11(4) of
the TEU and thus enjoys constitutional character. It gives EU citizens the
power to ‘take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of
implementing the [EU] Treaties’.
The procedure requires a group of citizens from at least seven Member States
to form a citizens’ committee, register the initiative with the Commission and
collect at least one million signatures within one year (from at least one
quarter of Member States). Upon doing so, the Commission has three months
to respond, setting out the action it intends to take (if any).63
As of January 2016, there had been no initiatives in relation to investment law,
trade law or the TTIP. There has, however, been an attempted initiative, STOP
TTIP, whose registration was rejected by the Commission. In its reasons, the
Commission said that it was unable to accept the initiative because it requested
the Commission to not do something (not enter into negotiations on the TTIP)
which is outside the framework for the initiatives given by Regulation
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211/2011.64 The STOP TTIP has since appealed this decision to the CJEU and
has continued to garner support, attracting over 3,400,000 participants as at
March 2016.65
(b) Parliamentary Committees – INTA
In addition to the Commission’s initiatives, there are Parliamentary processes
which increase the participation of EU citizens. There is a permanent
parliamentary standing Committee on International Trade (‘INTA’) which has
purview over international investment law policy.66
INTA, as all of the Parliamentary committees, holds public hearings with
industry experts to discuss trade and investment issues. In 2015, the EU’s
FTAs, the TTIP in particular, were a common thread in most of these hearings.
These included hearings on the EU’s future trade and investment strategy
generally, its trade and investment relationship with Australia and New
Zealand, the potential benefits of the TTIP for Europeans, its challenges, its
ISDS and the regulatory aspects and a joint hearing with the Committee on
Industry, Research and Energy on the impact on it in regard to its discreet
policy areas.67
All of this public participation contributes to the workings of INTA, which
make recommendations to the Commission and Parliament. In June 2015, it
tabled a report in Parliament containing recommendations to the Commission
on the TTIP negotiations (discussed further below).
(c) European Economic and Social Committee
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65
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The principal formal involvement of civil society is channelled through the
European Economic and Social Committee (‘EESC’). Created by the Treaty of
Rome as an advisory body, the EESC has permanent legal character,68
consisting of economic and social interest groups that are nominated by
national governments and appointed by the Council. Article 304 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) requires the Parliament,
Council and Commission to consult it, giving the EESC the right to participate
in EU governance. It may also issue an opinion on its own initiative.69 Since
2014, the EESC has issued four such opinions on investment law policy: one
on the EU-Japan FTA70 and three concerning the TTIP.71
In its 2014 opinion titled Transatlantic trade relations and the EESC's views
on an enhanced cooperation and eventual EU-US FTA, the EESC stressed the
importance of a transparent and inclusive dialogue with stakeholders
throughout the process.72
3

TTIP-Specific Initiatives

Further to the initiatives discussed above, the Commission has also
specifically adopted a number of initiatives to increase the citizen participation
in the TTIP negotiations with the US.
Since the 2014 elections, especially, DG Trade has prioritised transparency
throughout the negotiation TTIP process. In an official communication to the
Commission, the new Commissioner Malmström proposed a ‘Transparency
Initiative’, to ‘increase transparency, and … win public trust and support for
68
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the TTIP’, including to publish more texts and provide a broader level of
access of negotiating documents to the members of parliament. 73
There are now many more negotiating documents being made public than
there were previously. Following each round of negotiations, a negotiation
progress report74 and statement from the lead negotiator were subsequently
released,75 together with factsheets, negotiating texts, proposals and position
papers.76
(a) TTIP Advisory group
In January 2014, the Commission established a 14-member TTIP Advisory
Group, made out of industry stakeholders and experts from the environment,
health, consumer and workers’ interests sectors. The group consults the
Commission on specific issues which it has expertise in. It is chaired by the
EU’s chief negotiator on the TTIP.77
As at February 2016, the group had held 23 meetings, reporting on each one of
them. The reports indicate that ISDS was a frequently-discussed topic. These
discussions were predominantly in the form of a Q&A session between the
group members and the chair.78 As at February 2016, the meetings reported
that the ISDS proposal had not yet been addressed in negotiations.
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(b) European Ombudsman’s Inquiry
The European Ombudsman was created under the Treaty of Maastricht and
now, under article 228 of the TFEU, has the power inquire into
maladministration of the EU institutions.
On 29 July 2014, the Ombudsman began an inquiry on its own initiative into
the transparency and accessibility of the TTIP negotiations under the
Commission.79
As part of this inquiry, the Ombudsman conducted a public consultation,
where the ‘overwhelming majority’ of over 6,000 responses were that ‘the EU
needs to be more transparent as regards TTIP, notably in relation to its
contacts with business representatives’.80
In concluding its inquiry, the Ombudsman made ten suggestions for the
Commission to increase transparency of the TTIP negotiations.81 In response,
the Commission said that it would consider the suggestions ‘but it will have to
do this within the context of the overall approach to transparency that will be
set out by the Commission over the months ahead, and to which this inquiry is
a valid contribution’.82
IV

AUSTRALIA

This area of law has also reached a flashpoint in Australia. This began in April
2011, when the then Gillard-led government made waves in the international
investment law space by becoming the first developed country to publicly
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discontinue its practice of agreeing to international agreements containing
ISDS clauses.83
Since then, the public discourse on ISDS has risen exponentially and societal
discontent follows it. Indeed, statistics show that the media reporting of the
issue is easily ten-fold what it was in 2011.84 This opposition to ISDS in
Australia stems from an alliance of sorts between the political left, outraged by
Phillips Morris’ allegations of expropriation of its investments by the
government in enacting anti-tobacco legislation, and the economic right,
sceptical of the economic advantages brought by preferential trade
agreements.85
The upshot of this has been an increase in public debate and deliberation on
the issues surrounding Australia’s international investment law policy. This is
reflected in this increased media coverage and also an increased number of
parliamentary reviews on proposed laws like the ‘Anti-ISDS Bill’ and bilateral
FTAs.86
Australia’s policy processes need to accommodate for this increase in the
public discourse and the government is well aware. This chapter looks at the
participatory initiatives that may accommodate this increase in public
participation.
Process Generally
The power to enter into treaties is an exclusive right granted to the executive
arm of government under section 61 of the Australian Constitution. The power
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to implement and ratify treaties, however, rests with the legislative arm of
government (the Parliament) under section 51(xxix).
Consequently, the government negotiates and signs a treaty and Parliament
passes any legislation required to ratify the treaty. Once a treaty is signed, it is
tabled in Parliament with a National Interest Analysis on why Australia should
be party to the treaty. The treaty is then open to parliamentary debate and
considered by parliamentary committee(s). The committee provides a report
for Parliament and may make recommendations for future courses of action.87
The treaty must then pass both Houses of Parliament, together with any other
legislation required for its implementation before any action is taken under the
treaty.
Participatory Initiatives
Participation in Australia’s international investment law policy process is
facilitated through the executive arm of government and Parliament. Both of
these two arms of Australian Government provide ample opportunity for
citizen and specific stakeholder participation.
1

Government Initiatives

The Australian Government implements its international trade and investment
policies through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (‘DFAT’).
‘Promoting trade’ and ‘attracting investment’ form two of the four key pillars
of the government’s ‘economic diplomacy agenda’; the cornerstone of its
international foreign affairs policy.88
In implementing this agenda, DFAT undertakes a number of initiatives that
increase the citizen and stakeholder participation in its international
investment law policy.
87
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(a) Consultations and Submissions Generally
DFAT undertakes public and targeted consultations before entering into all of
its international investment and trade agreements.89 According to the
government, these ensure that the stakeholders’ views are essential to
understanding the key commercial-level factors that are relevant to their
negotiating priorities.90
First, anyone is invited to make submissions on the relevant agreement
generally or on a specific issue, in as much detail as they wish. Second, it
holds specific consultations with state and territory governments, industry
groups and businesses, NGOs, but also academics and citizens generally. They
are advertised in the media and on DFAT’s website and are stated as forming
the basis of the government’s position on whether such agreements are in the
national interest and not ‘merely so that those with an interest feel included’.91
They take the form of one-to-one meetings, group meetings, roundtables with
industry representatives, professional bodies, or sector-specific stakeholders
and public forums. In addition, in 2014 the government established a 20member Trade and Investment Policy Council to facilitate dialogue with the
business community and ‘to contribute a commercial perspective to trade and
investment policy’. The council is made out of industry experts across the
main sectors of the economy.92
(b) Provision of Information
The DFAT online platform gives the public access to a huge amount of
information on the government’s international investment law policy. It’s
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‘Trade at a glance’ is an interactive website that gives information on all of
Australia’s top trade and investment partners by imports, exports, goods and
services.93 There are fact sheets on all of Australia’s trade partners, an
interactive map showing regional economies and statistics available on
Australia’s trade and investment flows.94 There are platforms dedicated to
specific topics, such as foreign investment and ISDS.95 There is also up to date
information on ongoing negotiations of FTAs with other countries.96
There are also two regular newsletter services available for free subscription,
one targeted to business (Business Envoy)97 and one to the general public
(Tradetalk)98.
(c) Government-Commissioned Independent Reviews
The government also commissions independent bodies to undertake reviews of
its international trade and investment policies. These reviews use public
submissions and consultations to progress their inquiries. Two of these
reviews undertaken by the previous Australian Labor Party-led governments
had a significant impact on governmental policy.
First, in 2008, the Rudd-led government commissioned Mr David Mortimer
AO and Dr John Edwards, of the Centre of Economic Development of
Australia, to conduct a review of Australia’s export policies.99
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In conducting the review, they received 157 submissions and consulted
directly with 194 stakeholders, from domestic governments to businesses,
governmental departments, universities and individuals.100
Of its expansive range of recommendations, the review made particular
reference to Australia’s need to ‘secure its prosperity in [the] new global
economy’101 and recommended:
a)

establishing new benchmarks for FTAs; and

b)

reinvigorating Asia Pacific Economic Community trade and investment
agenda, with the long-term goal of achieving a region-wide FTA.102

Shortly after this review, the government commenced consultations on the
TPP and prepared for negotiations, perhaps taking heed of this review’s
advice.
Second, in November 2009, the government requested the Productivity
Commission, an independent government agency, to examine Australia’s
FTAs and their effectiveness in responding to recent economic and trade
developments.103 The Commission ‘actively encouraged public participation’
and received public submissions, held stakeholder meetings and convened
various workshops with the stakeholders. As part of its findings of November
2010, the Commission controversially concluded that ISDS provisions do not
have a significant impact on investment flows and there are ‘considerable
financial risks’ emanating from such provisions.104
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In April 2011, four months following the Commission’s report, the then
Gillard-led government denounced its use of ISDS in its FTAs and investment
agreements and made it official policy not to use them.105 The government
stated that in coming to its position on ISDS, the Commission’s report had
been ‘closely considered’ and that the new policy was ‘highly consistent’ with
their recommendations.106
It is clear that the Commission considered the public submissions in forming
this position. It makes many references to public submissions and quotes them
in a number of instances, for example when discussing:
a) the regulatory chill effect of ISDS;107
b) the higher level of rights afforded to foreign investors by ISDS
mechanisms;108
c) the degree of freedom of arbitral tribunals in ISDS cases;109
d) the possibility of conflicts of interest and institutional biases in
arbitration, lack of transparency and the costs incurred;110 and
e) if Australia should not adopt treaties with ISDS or not.111
Perhaps critically, it did not rely on any public submission or consultation
specifically in support of ISDS, stating it:
received no feedback from Australian businesses or industry associations indicating that
ISDS provisions were of much value or importance to them. Indeed, as far as the
Commission is aware, no Australian business has made use of ISDS provisions in
Australian [FTAs or investment agreements].112
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2

Parliamentary Initiatives

In addition to being comprised of elected members, the Australian Parliament
also provides a number of opportunities for further public participation in the
policy process.
(a) Parliamentary Committees
Parliamentary committees are a major participatory component of Australia’s
legislative arm of government, giving the public an outlet to directly
participate in the law-making process and help members of parliament access
a wide range of community and expert views.113
The role undertaken by the committee depends on the terms of reference
referred to it by either House of Parliament, Minister or by law.114 This
reference procedure is said to be a ‘commitment to greater public participation
with committees as the point of public access’.115
Upon being referred a matter, the committee advertises the terms of reference
in the media and invites submissions from the public or any other stakeholder,
where anyone may lodge a written submission.116 The committee then holds a
public hearing, with some of those who made submissions being invited to
give evidence for the committee to clarify the submissions and examine
opposing views with them.117 Following the hearings and review of all the
evidence, the committee prepares a report to be presented to Parliament, with
recommendations for future action. Reports of dissenting committee members
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are also published. The report, submissions made to the committee and the
transcript of proceedings are available online.
The following standing (permanent) and select (temporary) committees have
played a large part in the participatory functions of the Australian international
investment law policy process.
(i)

Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade

The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Committee takes an active role in scrutinising the government’s proposed bills
and policy in general. In recent years it has undertaken inquiries into each of
the proposed FTAs with Korea, Japan and China and also undertook an
inquiry into the Commonwealth’s treaty-making process generally.118
The committee received 94 submissions and held two days of public hearings
with witnesses from public authorities, academics, trade unions and NGOs. A
large number of the submissions were from ‘individuals concerned about the
secrecy surrounding the negotiations of bilateral and regional FTAs, in
particular the Trans-Pacific Partnership’119 but also industry bodies, unions,
academics and other stakeholders. In its report, it found the evidence to be
‘overwhelmingly critical, and occasionally scathing’ of DFAT’s assertions that
the current system was sufficient.120
It concluded that there was ‘no doubt that in respect of the Commonwealth
treaty-making process there is a groundswell for change’121 and made 10
recommendations in order to ensure a higher level of consultation and
information provided before agreements are signed and increase the role of the
Parliament.122

118

Trade Committee Report above n 35, 2.
Ibid 3.
120
Ibid 71-73.
121
Ibid 71.
122
Ibid; ibid xiii-xiv (‘Recommendations’).
119

47

(2016) 18 UNDALR

(ii)

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

Since 1996, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties has been appointed at
the beginning of each Parliamentary term by Resolution of Appointment of the
two Houses of Parliament jointly. This committee reviews each one of
Australia’s FTAs that it enters into, together with the National Interest
Analyses and proposed treaty actions arising from the FTA.123
(b) Private Members Bills
Another way the Parliament may play a role in the international investment
law policy process is through the legislative proposals of non-government
members; Private Members Bills.124 As they require the majority of the
members to support them, they rarely crystallise into law, though they are still
useful as a technique of generating debate on a matter. Two such bills have
been proposed by non-government members in recent years and have added to
the public discourse on international investment law policy.
First, in February 2012, independent Mr Katter introduced a bill to Parliament
concerning the treaty-making process in Australia generally. This Treaties
Ratification Bill 2012 contained just one substantive provision, s4:
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The Governor-General must not ratify a treaty unless both Houses of the Parliament have,
by resolution, approved the ratification.

The bill was referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties for
legislative inquiry, which tabled its report on the bill in Parliament in August
2012.125 The committee recommended against the bill’s passing, due to the
practical issues it would cause, that there was no provision for treaties in times
of emergency and the likelihood of political parties obstructing certain
treaties.126 It did, however, agree with the member that greater transparency is
required in the treaty-making process and was ‘disappointed that the process
has not been pursued’.127
Second, in March 2014, a Senator of the Australian Greens Party introduced
the Trade and Foreign Investment (Protecting the Public Interest) Bill 2014. It
also had just one substantive provision, s3:
The Commonwealth must not, on or after the commencement of this Act, enter into an
agreement (however described) with one or more foreign countries that includes an
investor-state dispute settlement provision.

The bill was referred to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Legislation Committee for inquiry and report. It received easily the highest
number of responses of any committee inquiring into an international
investment law-related bill, receiving 142 written submissions and over 11,000
emails.128 It held a public hearing on 6 August 2014.
The majority of submissions supported the purpose of the bill.129 Despite this
support, however, the committee took greater credence from those submitters
arguing against the bill, including academics, and also the major Australian
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companies and businesses in support of ISDS.130 Notwithstanding these bills’
failure, they both contributed to the debate on treaty-making process in
Australia and has been referred to on a number of times since.131
3

Trans-Pacific Partnership

Like the TTIP in Europe, the TPP in Australia has garnered a huge amount of
public debate. When it was concluded and signed on 6 October 2015, there
were a number of parts that fanned this public debate, including the insertion
of an ISDS mechanism in the investment chapter.132
At the time of writing, the TPP was before the legislatures of each party for
ratification. In Australia, before any binding treaty action is taken, the text and
a National Interest Analysis like those done for previous FTAs is tabled in
Parliament. The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties will conduct and
inquiry and prepare a report for the legislature, which will consider any
legislative changes necessary for the agreement to be implemented.133
Public consultations commenced on 3 October 2008 ‘in line with the
Government’s commitment to ensuring Australia’s trade objectives are
pursued on the basis of full community consultation’ and would form the basis
of the government’s priorities and for Australia’s participation in the
negotiations.134 Initial reports on these concluded that there was ‘widespread
interest in and support for Australia’s participation in the TPP’.135 In this first
set of consultations, concerns over ISDS were already articulated.136
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On 20 Nov 2008, the then Trade Minister Simon Crean announced that
Australia would participate in TPP negotiations and the first round took place
in March 2010. Between this round and November 2011, there were nine
negotiating rounds. There are reports made on each round which are published
online.137 Although these reports outline generally what had been discussed,
none of them specifically mention ISDS or investment protection.
In September 2011 and as a result of growing public perception of the
negotiations being secretive and behind closed doors, the parties publicly
released the letters to each other setting out the handling of negotiating texts.
The model letter stated that all negotiating documents were confidential and
could only be provided to government officials or persons participating in the
consultation process.138
Following the 9th round of negotiations in November 2011, the parties’ Trade
Ministers issued a report on negotiations to date and released a ‘broad
outlines’ of the agreement, including on an investment chapter. It said:
Investment. The investment text will provide substantive legal protections for
investors and investments of each TPP country in the other TPP countries… The
investment text will include provisions for expeditious, fair, and transparent investorState dispute settlement subject to appropriate safeguards, with discussions continuing
on scope and coverage. The investment text will protect the rights of the TPP
countries to regulate in the public interest.139

From December 2011 through August 2013, there were a further ten
negotiating rounds, all of which were reported online. Each round of
negotiations included a number of stakeholder events, with ‘Stakeholder
Forums’ typically being involved, which typically attracted 250 to 300
The CFMEU and AFTINET raised concerns about investor-state dispute settlement and the
regulation of foreign investment’.
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participants. None of these mentioned negotiations on ISDS or investor
protection.
From October 2013 there were also a further 12 meetings of the chief
negotiators and 9 meetings of the Ministers or Leaders of the parties. Like the
negotiating rounds, each of these meetings are reported online, if brief. None
of these mentioned negotiations on ISDS or investor protection.
On 6 October 2015, the TPP was concluded and the government duly
announced its signing. Trade Minister Andrew Robb announced that a ‘robust
and modern investor-state dispute settlement mechanism will protect
Australian investors overseas, as well as the government's right to regulate,
including on public health.’ 140
On 9 February 2016, the government tabled the text of the agreement and an
accompanying National Interest Analysis in Parliament. The analysis reports
that 83 public submissions were received and 485 stakeholders were consulted
throughout and following the negotiations.141
V

ASSESSMENT AND COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION

The EU’s and Australia’s international investment law policy processes and
structures are assessed according to their levels of openness, inclusiveness and
responsiveness; the three sub-principles of participation as laid down by article
11 of the TEU.
Assessment of participation in the EU
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1

Openness

At the outset, it can be said that the EU is at least aware that its international
investment policy processes should be more open. This is made clear by
looking at the contrast in approaches of the Commission, prior to and
following the 2014 election.
In relation to the TTIP, prior to the election for example, the then Trade
Commissioner Karl de Gucht, was pushing the TTIP almost exclusively on the
back of the advantages offered by it.142 Since then, however, Commissioner
Malmström has consistently pushed the need for transparency in negotiating it;
remarking in an official policy document that ‘I’m determined to make these
the most transparent EU trade talks ever’.143 She has committed to publishing
more documents on trade and investment negotiations, including the final text
as agreed.144
This new approach ties in with the ‘Transparency Initiative’ outlined above,
which has improved the level of openness in a process that was previously
seen as secretive and opaque. Since the change of commissioner, there have
been reports made on the progress of TTIP negotiations following each round.
The openness of the process is increased further by the workings of the
Parliament, particularly the INTA committee. By holding its hearing in public,
together with public workshops and presentations, the public is further able to
access information on the EU’s progress on international investment law
policy and its position at the time.
Finally, the openness is bolstered by the information available on the
initiatives themselves. The Commission’s online platform ‘Your Voice in
Europe’ and DG Trade’s online platform ‘Trade Policy and You’ has
142
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information on consultations, civil society dialogues, publications, events and
the possibility of a weekly newsletter. There are also separate online platforms
for the INTA Committee and the European Citizens’ Initiative. These all make
it far easier for the public to access information on the investment law policy
process and how they may participate further.
In relation to the TTIP specifically, there is publicly accessible information on
the input,145 the process,146 outcome147 and motives148 of the Commission. The
parameters for openness provided in chapter one, therefore, show a favourable
assessment.
(a) Deficiencies
The glaring omission, is the scarcity of reporting on the progress of the issue
of ISDS in the TTIP, with reports stating that this issue has not to date been
addressed. This very question was put to the chief negotiator in the TTIP
Advisory Group, where he ‘explained that these are market access
discussions… [and that] there are no ongoing discussions with the US about
investment protection or ISDS’.149 Given the immense public scrutiny and
divisive nature surrounding this issue, it is questionable whether the
Commission is being truly open in its reporting in this respect.
This view is commonly held. Indeed, over 3.4 million citizens who have
supported the STOP TTIP citizens’ initiative centre their criticism on how the
‘democratic dimension of the planned agreement: rules, which have farreaching consequences for 500 million EU citizens in 28 member states, are
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negotiated behind closed doors’,150 and this sentiment was echoed by the
majority of participants to the Ombudsman’s consultation on the transparency
of TTIP negotiations. This feeling has not waned since the introduction of the
new Trade Commissioner’s Transparency Initiative.151

2

Inclusiveness

The assessment of the inclusiveness turns on whether the participatory
initiatives are available to general participation and public scrutiny, including
as wide a cross-section of interests as possible, and avoid the over-influence of
strong, organised groups.
In regard to achieving a wide cross section, many of the initiatives put forward
are open to all EU citizens. The Citizens’ Dialogues are on a ‘first come, first
served’ basis (in the words of the Commission), public consultations are open
for anyone online throughout the consultation period, INTA Committee
hearings are public and these affect the recommendations that it prepares and
are adopted by the Parliament, any EU Citizen may begin a European
Citizens’ Initiative or a petition and the information workshops and seminars
held by DG Trade are open for anyone who can attend.
There are also ample opportunities for the public to get involved in
consultations, as they are conducted in various forms by the Commission,
INTA and the Ombudsman. The TTIP consultation should be lauded as a
successful initiative in attracting well over 100,000 citizen participants.
There is also a clear, strong push by the EU to include civil society in the
process and rightly so, as the ‘primary dimension of citizen involvement
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through consultations can only be one that is representative’.152 DG Trade’s
civil society dialogues, consultations and invitations for participation are
instructive of this. Civil society’s voice as a whole is also strongly represented
through the EESC, which specifically enjoys a constitutional right to be
consulted by the EU institutions, and also the TTIP Advisory Group,
specifically set up to oversee TTIP negotiations.
(a) Deficiencies
Despite the ample opportunities, in regard to the Commission’s consultations
generally, there appears to be a significant lack of representation of the public
generally. Except for the consultation on the TTIP and ISDS, there was almost
no citizen participation. In other consultations conducted by the Commission,
for example, there was only one (or even no) individual public participants.153
In many cases also, as one commentator found, ‘‘ordinary citizens’ are not
knowledgeable enough to complete the questionnaires prepared by the
Commission, especially when a consultation concerns niche areas or technical
issues.’154
Further, it has been suggested that individuals prefer to give their opinion in a
simple way, such as petitions, rather than providing substantive answers
(which is supported in this case by the strong numbers for the STOP TTIP
citizens’ initiative). As Marxsen argues, ‘citizens understand that joining
forces is the way to intervene at the European level much more than providing
individual, isolated views’.155 Further, although European Citizens’ Initiatives
152
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may be initiated by any EU citizen, they still demand significant resources,
networks, organisation capacity and public relations to pass the initial hurdles
– perhaps the most demanding of which is needing to obtain 1,000,000
participants.156 The requirements for being registered are also overly technical
and provide the Commission too much discretion to reject submitted
initiatives. This is epitomised in the Commission’s refusal to register the
STOP TTIP initiative, despite it garnering easily the most participants of any
of the proposed initiatives to date. Consequently, they are, despite the title, ‘in
fact not primarily a mechanism for the involvement of individual citizens’.157
There are also concerns as to the cross-section of civil society being included.
In regard to the consultations, previous studies have shown generally that
‘organisations with a business or industry background dominate the
consultative process’.158 This leaves the level of participation of not-for-profit
organisations or public interest organisations lacking, where participating at
the EU level is prohibitively cost intensive.159
3

Responsiveness

The responsiveness of the policy process is the most difficult to assess as it is
difficult to know exactly what the institutions consider, and to what extent, in
the deciding on the direction of the EU international investment policy.
Turning to the deficiencies first, on the Europeans Citizens Initiative
generally, responses by the Commission have been criticised as lacking
ambition,160 being ‘contrary to the principle of ‘participatory democracy’’161
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and plainly ignoring the requests made by the initiative.162 It has subsequently
been suggested that ‘unless the Commission finds ways to take the proposals
more seriously, it is highly unlikely that [they] will play any significant role in
the future.’163 In the international investment policy realm, it appears to be a
missed opportunity by the Commission electing not to consider the STOP
TTIP initiative, if not even in an informal manner, given the wide support that
it has collected.
In regard to its response to civil society participation, its involvement in the
TTIP Advisory Group questions the quality of response it provides. From a
review of the meeting reports, it does not appear that the group was given any
substantial information that was not already made public and instead of a twoway discussion, where the members could influence the direction of
negotiations, it appeared much more akin to a Q&A session, where the
members’ views would not likely be taken into account. Likewise, the
Commission’s

response

to

the

Ombudsman’s

suggestions

regarding

transparency appeared non-committal and the actual effect of the suggestions
must therefore be questionable.
Other mechanisms, such as the EESC have been subject to empirical analyses
on their effect on decision-making and it is generally agreed that they do have
an influence, if restricted.164 Specifically on the TTIP, the EESC’s opinion on
the TTIP discussed above may well have had an impact on the policy stance of
the EU, as a number of recommendations were adopted by the Commission in
their negotiating position on ISDS (though these recommendations were not
particularly unique).165
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More broadly, there is no part of article 11 of the TEU, nor any other provision
or regulation, which requires the EU institutions to consider the views put
forward by the people and civil societies in making its decisions and to what
extent.166 This allows the Commission to fail to adequately report on the
outcome of its participatory initiatives, leaving citizens to rely on an
‘underlying faith that bureaucrats will act in an enlightened manner, seeking
input from outsiders when appropriate and taking proper account of the
information received’.167
(a) TTIP Consultation, Concept paper and Proposed ISDS provisions
Perhaps the clearest and most positive view of the responsiveness of the EU
can be found in the Commission’s concept paper and proposed ISDS
provisions for the TTIP in response to the public consultation on ISDS in the
TTIP.
First, the public’s views and suggestions on ISDS in the TTIP were
summarised and reported in the Commission’s report on the consultation,168
identifying four prevailing issues of concern arising from the public
consultation:
1. the protection of the right to regulate;
2. the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals;
3. the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS; and
4. the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism.
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Second, these four issues were addressed in the Commission’s concept paper
and a specific response and suggested negotiating position was given for each
issue.169
Third, significantly, each one of these proposed negotiating positions were
adopted by the Commission in the EU’s proposal for ISDS in the TTIP, which
was tabled in November 2015.170
Further, on 29 February 2016, the EU and Canada agreed to amend, among
others, the ISDS mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement. These amendments are largely based on the EU’s proposal for
ISDS in the TTIP.
It is clear that the Commission has responded to each of the principal concerns
raised by the public consultation, as each one of them has been specifically
addressed and then used as a basis for its negotiating position with the US.
Consequently, it is possible that in this case the views of less than 150,000
citizens (in a populace of more than half a billion) made a significant and
direct impact on the international investment policy of the EU; surely a
sterling example of the responsiveness of participatory democracy in action.
Assessment of participation in Australia
1

Openness

Australia’s processes are on its face very open. The amount of available
information on each one of its investment and FTAs is substantial. It provides
information on the agreement itself, its various trading partners, fact sheets on
specific topics and a continually updated news service, with two specific trade
and investment related newsletters.
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Each report undertaken by the parliamentary committees, independently
commissioned experts or government (DFAT) are all made publicly available,
together with the submissions made for the purposes of reports, details of
participants in private consultations and transcripts of public hearings (in the
case of the committee hearings).
Where the openness of the process falls down significantly, however, is the
information provided to the public during negotiations of a given FTA. This
sentiment has been consistently echoed when discussing the international
investment law policy process in Australia.
As the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee found, the
principal concern is that the texts of the FTAs are only presented to Parliament
and the public after they are signed, leaving it with an ‘all-or-nothing’
choice,171 being:
…counter-intuitive for complex trade agreements which are years in the making to
be negotiated in secret, subject to stakeholder and parliamentary scrutiny for a few
short months with no realistic capacity for text to be changed, and then for
implementing legislation to be rushed through parliament unamended. This comes
very close to making a mockery of the process and of parliament's involvement.172

For the government’s part, it maintains that the ‘fundamental rationale for [the
confidentiality] is, if you start releasing your bottom line, your negotiating
strategy, and everyone can see it, then you are not going to get the best
outcome’.173
This contradiction in the views of committees is largely explained by the party
politics in Australia. As Sawyer states, outcomes of parliamentary committees
are usually pre-determined by party positions.174 Indeed, since the change of
government in September 2013, when a committee has recommended
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implementing a treaty, it has had more members of the Liberal (governing)
Party and when it has recommended against implementing it, it has had more
members of the Labor (opposition) Party or Australian Greens.175
Example of deficiencies
The relative lack of openness in FTA negotiations is made no clearer than by
the conduct of the government throughout its negotiations on the TTP.
After 9 rounds of negotiations, which were under strict terms of
confidentiality,176 where apparently investor protection and ISDS in particular
was not mentioned, or if it was it wasn’t reported publicly, and then after the
Ministers’ report to the leaders again not mentioning it, the ‘broad outlines’ of
the agreement stated that the agreement would include ISDS.
Then following a further ten negotiating rounds and numerous meetings of the
chief negotiators and the Ministers, all of which were reported online, still
there was no mention any negotiations on ISDS or investor protection. It was
not until the TPP was announced on 6 October 2015, over five years after
negotiations commenced, that an official announcement concerning ISDS in
the TPP was made.
Importantly, throughout this period of frequent negotiating and numerous
meetings, public debate was intensifying, beginning in 2011 with the
Government’s decision to remove all ISDS provisions in future agreements
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(discussed above) and shown in a dramatic rise in media reporting referring to
ISDS from this period onwards.177
Yet, despite this boom in public interest and the constant reporting on the
progress of negotiations, there was no government reporting on this most
divisive issue. This is a considerable shortcoming in the openness of the
Australia’s process.
2

Inclusiveness

The Australian Government strives to ensure that its processes are available to
general participation and public scrutiny. Certainly, one of Australia’s
principal strengths is the continual invitation for submissions and consultations
from the public. In all of the independently-commissioned reviews, committee
inquiries and throughout the negotiations, invitations for public submissions
have been published in the media and online.
For example, in the case of the inquiry into the Trade and Investment
(Protecting the Public Interest) Bill the Parliamentary committee received
over 11,000 emails in support. This process gives the community a chance to
have input on legislation that affects them and ‘guides’ negotiators throughout
FTA negotiations.178 As Halligan states, these functions ‘involve the broader
community in the policy making process, providing a forum for policy debate
and the committee as an extension of the democratic process that becomes
thereby more participatory’.179
As regards consultations, it is clear that attempts are made to gain ongoing
feedback from stakeholders throughout the government’s negotiations on
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FTAs. DFAT estimated that it consulted with more than 1,000 participants
regarding the TPP.180
In addition to consultations with stakeholders, the government undertakes
considerable consultations with experts. This is shown in it commissioning
experts to undertake a number of lengthy reviews discussed above. Further, in
addition to informal consultations undertaken by DFAT, the Parliamentary
committees discussed above all hold public hearings and invite participants
that have made submissions to the committee to attend to give evidence. These
hearings result in public reporting, culminating in a higher level of public
participation than what occurs in the parliamentary chambers. These functions
therefore provide a formal channel of communication between the public and
Parliament, encouraging greater community participation.181
(a) Deficiencies
Despite these steps taken to include the public in its international investment
law policy making, there remains a number of deficiencies in Australia’s
attempt to do so. The principal concern is the lopsided nature of participation
between stakeholders with business interests against NGOs, not-for-profit
associations and individuals.
For example, the numbers that are available on the TPP show that during
negotiations, submissions to and consultations with government is dominated
by business, trade associations or unions.182 The level of individual and NGO
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participants is far lower. Consequently, while it is important for the
government to access business input to assist it in understanding ‘commerciallevel factors’,183 the cross-section of individuals and civil society being
included in the process favours the profit-seeking participants with strong
resources.
Further, Parliamentary committees are not referred inquiries into any FTAs
until after they were signed, seriously calling into question the utility of the
public making submissions and attending hearings into these committee
inquiries. As the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee found,
‘it is pointless for [committee] inquiries to begin after agreements are
signed’.184 It has also been suggested that the quality of stakeholder
consultation through treaty negotiations is not as effective as it could be, due
to the apparent lack of access to documents through the negotiating stage. It is
said this makes stakeholders having to speculate on the contents of an
agreement, and compromises the level of expert input available to DFAT. As
one submitter to the parliamentary committee said, ‘it is nice to have the
conversation, but it is not a very high value engagement at the moment’.185
These criticisms have again, however, come from committees with an
opposition party-majority membership. In other inquiries, the current
consultation

process

has

been

mostly

welcomed186

and

industry

representatives are generally satisfied with the current process.187 Further,
although the committee consultations are conducted after the agreements have
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been signed, DFAT consultations and submissions are invited and publicised
even before negotiations commence. As said by the Joint Standing Committee
on Treaties, it ‘urges stakeholders to take full advantage of the existing
opportunities for consultation during the negotiations of bilateral trade
agreements and to be proactive in putting their case to the negotiators’.188 It is
perhaps a case of the government showing us the door, but not being able to
walk us through.
3

Responsiveness

The responsiveness of the Australian process is again difficult to assess.
Certainly, it appears that it relies strongly on expert advice which, in turn,
considers community views. The previous Gillard-Government responded to
expert and community concerns that the government’s right to regulate would
be restricted under ISDS in FTAs. This response is made clear in April 2011,
four months following the Productivity Commission’s report, when it
denounced its use of ISDS in its FTAs and investment agreements. The
government stated that in coming to its position on ISDS, the Commission’s
report had been ‘closely considered’ and that the new policy was ‘highly
consistent’ with their recommendations.

Considering the wide level

consultation that the Productivity Commission took into account on
community views, and also that apparently there were no active supporters of
ISDS in the Commission’s eyes, it is a reasonable conclusion that its
community consultation played a large part in changing this policy.
This is also illustrated in its response to the independent review of Australia’s
export policies. Conducted by economic commercial experts and considering a
wide range of stakeholder submissions and consultation, among a number of
core recommendations was that Australia should aim to achieve an AsiaPacific region-wide FTA. Just two months following these recommendations,
188
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the then Trade Minister announced that Australia would participate in TTP
negotiations.189
Nowadays, there is less indication from the government on what has
influenced its international trade and investment law policy. Perhaps the fact
that it is difficult to assess is in itself is a mark against the process, as the
Australian Government has very rarely released much more than cursory
details of which consultations and submissions it considered in making its
decisions. The National Interest Analyses, the principal reports prepared by
the government itself on each FTA following their signing, for example,
focuses on the arguments for implementing an FTA, but only gives scant detail
on what impact the stakeholder views had on this decision. In addition, there
has been no report on the work of the Trade and Investment Policy Council,
which was specifically set up to facilitate dialogue between the Minister and
the business community.
The example of the TTP negotiations again also indicates a poor
receptiveness to the public input in the process. In the context of wide media
attention, a Private Members Bill that garnered 11,000 emails in support and
public recommendations against the adoption of ISDS clauses, the
government quietly agreed to ISDS in the TPP, albeit with exceptions, with
so-far very little explanation of how or why it came to this position. If this
remains the case before the agreement is ratified, it would demonstrate a
considerable flaw in the participatory democratic process of Australia’s
international investment law policy.
Comparison of both processes
As against each other, it is first clear that the EU has a higher number of
participatory initiatives designed to ensure it remains as open as possible.

189

Mortimer Review above n 99 dated 1 September 2008 and the announcement to enter
negotiations came on 20 November 2009.

67

(2016) 18 UNDALR

Certainly, since the change of the DG Trade Commissioner, the Transparency
Initiative, which aims at enhancing the FTA negotiations as being more
transparent than ever, has increased the level of information available to the
public and other stakeholders. This, together with the Transparency Register
and the constant public appearances of EU officials (through consultations,
dialogues, debates, INTA hearings and the social networking) on its face
projects a very open policy process. Australia’s process also appears open,
with a substantial amount of accessible information on each agreement,
commissioned report, committee report and public and stakeholder
submission.
Despite the appearance of being open, however, both the EU and Australia
have glaring omissions in what they provide to the public during FTA
negotiations. This is evident in the negotiations of both of their biggest
investment-related agreements to date; the TTIP and TTP. Their respective
positions on ISDS were kept dormant in every one of their negotiating reports.
This was at a time when ISDS was (and continues to be) the most divisive
issue surrounding international investment law. The excuse that the issue
hadn’t been explored yet is not sufficient.
Notwithstanding this, the EU has recently shown a marked improvement in its
openness and this is none clearer than in releasing its negotiating position for
ISDS in November 2015 (before the negotiations have been concluded) and,
for this reason, it is submitted that its process is more open than Australia’s.
Second, the EU appears to have more inclusive initiatives, through the sheer
number of ways that the public and stakeholders may participate. The various
dialogues, formal online consultations, committee hearings, European Citizens
Initiative and civil society involvement through the EESC and other formal
consultations leave the people with ample opportunity to get involved. Despite
the number, however, these ‘soft mechanisms’ lack proper, wider
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representation and require a technical knowledge or an abundance of resources
to fully participate.
In contrast to the EU, there are no specific, targeted initiatives by the
Australian government to include the people in the investment law process.
However, the stakeholders and public are always invited to make submissions
and contact the relevant institution throughout every stage of the investment
law policy process; be it during the initial consultations years before
negotiations

commence,

continuous

informal

consultations

through

negotiations, expert consultation on specific industry fields and throughout the
committee scrutiny of the relevant investment-related agreement. It is true that
the recent statistics illustrate concerning lopsidedness towards profit-seeking
associations or businesses, but this is the case in the EU’s consultations as
well. Further, although the utility of including the public at the committee
stage after the agreement has already been signed is questionable, the
culmination of the public’s involvement at every step of the process can only
have a positive effect on the process more broadly. It is for this reason that
Australia’s process may be regarded as being more inclusive.
Finally, it is clear that the EU’s response to the results of a number of its own
initiatives was little more than indifference, refusing to look at easily the most
popular European Citizens’ Initiative, denying findings of the Ombudsman
regarding its transparency and using the TTIP Advisory Group as a Q&A
session without taking in any recommendations.
In comparison, the Australian process under the previous government was
clearly responsive to community and expert concerns about ISDS where it
changed its policy and, though this has changed to a case-by-case assessment
of ISDS, its policy still allows for action should attitudes change once again.
Apart from this response (five years ago), though, there is little to guide us as
to what the current government considers in forming its policy, which is an
indictment in itself. The reporting of consultations is scant and the response to
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committees is heavily influenced by party politics. Generally, it appears that
Australia places greater credence on expert opinion than it does public
opinion.
Conversely, though both processes have their own flaws, the formidable
illustration of the EU changing its policy on ISDS in the TTIP in response to
the consultation on this issue is surely an admirable example of ways that
governments could respond to public participation in this area of law. The
current EU process, therefore, must be regarded as more responsive.
VI

CONCLUSION

The EU and Australia were identified as representative democracies that both
hold closely the principles of participation to fill the gaps where free elections
alone are insufficient to grant the government legitimacy. These gaps are wide
in the area of international investment law, as the elected officials play an even
lesser role in the process than in domestic law-making. As participatory
democratic theorists in both the EU and Australia have contended, only direct
civic participation can act as the panacea for these democratic wounds.
In comparison to one another, it is submitted that Australia’s international
investment law policy process is more inclusive, but the EU’s is more open
and responsive to the public and could be used as a starting point for other
states. Despite this conclusion, however, this comparison has confirmed what
many have recently articulated more broadly. That is, if their participatory
processes fill the legitimacy gaps where representative democracy cannot,
there may lay many more gaps that remain exposed.
Yet, what stems from this finding? If it is true that the EU’s processes are
more participatory, it follows that the EU has a higher level of democratic
legitimacy than Australia. However, it does not necessarily follow that its
policy and position on investment law is more effective. In regard to the EU,
which is lambasted on a daily basis for its lack of transparency and public say
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in its trade and investment policy, it surely is not as technocratic and
dismissive of the public’s views as is made out. It has just dramatically
changed its traditional stance on ISDS as a result of public pressure and for
this, from a democratic perspective, it should be applauded.
On the part of Australia, which places a higher value on expert consultation,
there is an argument that this, rather than buckling to populist beliefs, leaves it
better equipped to efficiently and effectively conclude an FTA which is
tailored to the specific trade partner. This is seen by its recent promulgation of
multiple agreements, with many more in the pipeline (including with the EU).
It is not for this paper to assert that shying away from public participation
could be advantageous for a government, but if relying on experts more than
the masses is good enough for Plato,190 there must be merit in the argument.
Nevertheless, as Australia and the EU continue to rattle through agreements
that will change the landscape of trade and investment law across multiple
regions, this comparison has shown that, for two representative democracies
that would claim to be more participatory than most, neither could be used as a
perfect model for others in facilitating participation in their international
investment law policy processes.

190

See Plato’s seminal The Republic, recounted in Held above n 3, 23, where Plato likened a
democracy to a ship, where the captain is unable to sail due to the crew’s attempts to interfere
and lamenting that a democracy ‘treats all men as equal, whether they are equal or not’.
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